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ARGUMENT
Salt Lake City Southern Railroad Company, Inc. ("SLCSR") is alleged to have
failed to discover and eliminate a gap between rubber panels one and eight (s_ee_ SLCSR's
Addendum at Tabs 8 and 9) that allegedly channeled Mr. Goebel's bicycle wheel into the
rail. The directed verdict in SLCSR's favor was and remains proper because there was
no credible evidence that a gap, which a reasonable person would have thought to be
hazardous, existed for a sufficient amount of time before the accident to give SLCSR
constructive notice of its condition and an opportunity to repair it.
However, the trial court gratuitously ruled that certain statutory duties applicable
only to those who own or control railroad tracks were applicable in this case to SLCSR.
That ruling was not essential to the trial court's granting of the directed verdict, and
SLCSR appeals from that ruling. Although reversal of this dicta also would constitute
grounds to affirm the judgment in favor of SLCSR, a reversal or setting aside of this
dicta also is necessary to prevent the de facto alteration of the agreement between
SLCSR and the owner of the tracks in question, the Utah Transit Authority ("UTA").1
The trial court's ruling, if left intact, also would have precedential effect upon others who
own and control railroad tracks in this state (such as the Union Pacific Railroad) and
those who merely have the right to operate over those tracks (such as Amtrak).
Unless reversed or set aside as unnecessary dicta, the trial court's ruling now may

1

SLCSR and UTA are currently engaged in litigation wherein each claim the right to be
indemnified by the other for the defense of the Goebels' claims. These indemnity claims
may to some extent depend upon the crossing maintenance duties imposed by the
agreement.

be used to impose the responsibility to maintain railroad crossings onto companies that
merely operate trains over another's railroad. The trial court's ruling as to SLCSR's
maintenance duties imposes obligations that are of profound significance to SLCSR and
the railroad industry. Therefore, SLCSR urges the Court to folly consider and rule upon
the issues raised in this cross-appeal regardless of its ruling on whether the directed
verdict was proper because of absence of evidence that SLCSR had any notice of the
alleged hazardous condition at this particular crossing.
I.

DUTIES TO MAINTAIN A "RAILROAD" CROSSING ARE NOT
IMPOSED UPON COMPANIES THAT DO NOT OWN OR
OPERATE THE TRACKS.

SLCSR did not own the railroad crossing where Mr. Goebel fell from his bicycle.
SLCSR was sued simply because it had the right to operate trains over UTA's tracks that
included that crossing. SLCSR, by reason of the fact that it had the right to operate trains
over UTAfs right of way, did not owe a statutory duty to the public to maintain UTA's
railroad crossing surfaces. However, plaintiffs argued, and the trial court incorrectly
agreed, that a legal duty to do so existed under three Utah statutes and one city ordinance.
The statutes in question, UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-7-26, § 10-7-29, and § 56-1-11,
and the ordinance, Salt Lake City Ordinance § 14.44.030, attached to SLCSR's
Addendum at Tabs 1 through 4, pertain to companies that own tracks. They govern what
such companies must do to maintain their tracks where those tracks cross or run down
the middle of public streets or highways. Section 10-7-26 expressly states that it is
limited to any company that "owns or operates railway tracks." It does not state that it
pertains to companies that own or operate locomotives or rolling stock over another

company's railway tracks. This narrow definition expressly applies to § 10-7-29 as well
as § 10-7-26. See § 10-7-26(1). Section 56-1-11 also expressly applies only to railroad
companies when they own or control tracks that cross public streets and highways. That
statute, in its entirety states, "Every railroad company shall be liable for damages caused
by its neglect to make and maintain good and sufficient crossings at points where any
line of travel crosses its road." Id. Emphasis added. The ordinance at issue also
expressly pertains to "their [railway companys'] tracks" that are upon or across a city
street. This ordinance also is expressly limited to the entity who owns the "railroad" not
to other entities who own or operate trains over someone else's "railroad."
In this instance, the trial court undoubtably was confused because we refer to
companies that operate trains as "railroad companies." The distinction, however,
between entities that merely operate trains over someone else's tracks and entities which
own the tracks, must be recognized when the issue is the duty to maintain those tracks.
Although a "railroad company" may or may not own tracks, a "railroad" is not a
locomotive or a train. Rather, a "railroad" is "a road composed of parallel steel rails
supported by ties and providing a track for locomotive drawn trains and other rolling
stock." American Heritage Dictionary at 1078, definition 1 (1973).
Early in the history of railroading, it became obvious that situations would exist
where it made sense for one railroad to grant the right to another railroad to operate over
its tracks.2 Moreover, wherever freight cars are interchanged from one railroad company
2

Often these were reciprocal, such as the Denver and Rio Grande and Utah Railway
Agreement of 1911. Both railroads had a single set of tracks that paralleled the other
company's tracks from Helper to Provo. By agreeing to use each other's tracks, they

to another, so that the cars may continue their journey to their ultimate destination, either
the delivering railroad company or the receiving company, or both, must operate over
tracks that are owned and maintained by a different company. The practice of granting
trackage rights to railroads with no obligation or right to maintain the tracks has
expanded dramatically in the last fifty years. For example, railroad companies that had
been required by the federal government to provide passenger service were relieved of
this obligation if they permitted Amtrak to operate passenger trains over their tracks. See
45 U.S.C. § 545(e) (enacted 1970); 45 U.S.C. §§ 561(a)(1), 562(a)-(b), 564(a), 566(a),
(e), 581(a)-(b) and 583 (all enacted 1970 and repealed 1994) (West 1987 & Supp. 2003).
Also, as the railroad industry has consolidated over the last twenty years, the granting of
trackage rights to a competing railroad has become necessary to preserve competition.
For example, the approval by the Surface Transportation Board of the merger between
the Union Pacific Railroad and the Southern Pacific Railroad was conditioned upon,
among other things, the Union Pacific's grant to the Burlington Northern Santa Fe
Railroad of the right to operate over certain Union Pacific track in Utah. Union Pacific
Corp - Control & Merger - Southern Pacific Corp., STB Finance Docket 32760 (SubNo. 21), Decision No. 21 (STB served Dec. 20, 2001) (General Oversight Dec. No. 2 X
available at http://www.stb.dot.gov/decisions/Reading.Room.nsfDaily Releases.
The dicta of the trial court in this case ignores and re-defines the extensive and
long established practice of railroad companies operating over the tracks of other railroad

could designate one set for eastbound trains and the other set for westbound trains,
thereby both moving their trains more efficiently.

companies without becoming subject to the statutory duty to maintain the track owners'
crossings.
SLCSR does not own or operate UTA's tracks, including the subject crossing, just
because SLCSR is a "railroad company."3 Plaintiffs cite UTAH CODE ANN. § 56-2-2, but
that statute only prohibits a "railroad corporation operating or in control of the operation
of any railroad within the state" from hauling a defective car, coach, locomotive or other
rolling stock "owned, leased or controlled by said railroad company." Id., (emphasis
added). That statute does not make SLCSR the owner or operator of UTAfs tracks. It
emphasizes SLCSR's point that "railroad corporations" may operate rolling stock without
owning or operating the tracks. SLCSR does not contend it is not a railroad company
that operates freight trains. However, it is undisputed that only UTA owned the relevant
section of the "railroad" at the subject crossing for purposes of the statutes and ordinance
relied upon by plaintiffs.
Of course, an owner of railroad tracks may transfer the duty to maintain those
tracks to another entity without selling the right-of-way. Typically, this would be by
means of a lease of the right-of-way. That did not happen in this case.
Originally, this railroad right of way was owned by the Union Pacific. Union
Pacific sold the subject railroad to UTA. R. 2821-24, ^ 1.1(a), and 2880-81. UP only
retained "a railroad freight easement for the purpose of providing common carrier rail
freight service to all customers on the Right-Of-Way" that it sold to UTA. R. 2883-87

3

Although SLCSR did operate small trains over the subject track, there was no evidence
that this railroad actually owned the locomotives or cars in those trains.

(emphasis added). Pursuant to the sale agreement, UP conveyed that easement to
SLCSR, and SLCSR and UTA then entered into an Administration And Coordination
Agreement (the "Agreement'1). R. 2861, U 5.2(k) and (1), and 2896-2927. Under the
Agreement, SLCSR only had the right to provide freight rail service over track
designated for that use by UTA. R. 2901-03,12.1 and 2.3. This is a right to use UTA's
railroad, not a conveyance of an interest in the railroad. Indeed UTA and SLCSR
expressly agreed that SLCSR "shall have no right or obligation, and shall not
conduct, directly or indirectly,... any other activity whatsoever on the Right-OfWay that is not necessary to Freight Rail Service." Plaintiffs1 Addendum at 048-049.4
Other provisions of the Agreement further demonstrate that UTA was very careful
to retain cpntrol over the operation of its tracks and strictly limit SLCSR's right to use the
tracks.
The Agreement differentiates "Passenger Trackage" and "Freight Trackage." Id.,
at 045-047. SLCSR "shall have no right... to conduct, and shall not conduct, directly or
indirectly, Freight Rail Service on the Passenger Trackage

" Id., at 049, Tf 2.1.

Paragraph 5.1 of the Agreement reiterates this prohibition. "SLS [SLCSR] shall not have
any right to operate on the Passenger Trackage." IcL at 055 H 5.1. The next paragraph
gives SLCSR the authority to operate on "Freight Trackage." Id_. at 055 % 5.2. UTA,
however, designated which track was Freight Trackage and which track was Passenger
Trackage and, subject to not unreasonably interfering with freight service, UTA retained
the right to change those designations. IcL at 049 *| 2.3
4

A copy of the Agreement is found in Plaintiffs Addendum at 043-070.

"Freight Trackage shall mean any Joint Trackage and/or
Passenger Trackage, which is designated by UTA to be
Freight Trackage." Id. at 045 (emphasis added).
"Passenger Trackage shall mean all segments of trackage
constructed by UTA on the Right of Way . . . or any freight
Trackage hereafter designated by UTA to be Passenger
Trackage pursuant to Section 2.3 hereof." Id., at 047
(emphasis added).
2.3
UTA may from time to time, upon 30 days written
notice change any track designation (Freight Trackage,
Passenger Trackage or Joint Trackage) to any other track
designation; provided, however, that no such change in track
designation shall unreasonably interfere with SLS's
[SLCSRfs] Freight Rail Service." Id. at 049K2.3 (emphasis
added).
SLCSR was responsible to maintain and repair what UTA from time to time
designated as Freight Trackage, including grade crossings, but only to standards deemed
"necessary for freight rail service." Id- at 050 % 3.1 (emphasis added). Moreover, even if
SLCSR determined that modifications to a crossing were reasonably necessary to
accommodate its freight rail service, it could not make those modifications without
UTA's approval. "SLS [SLCSR] shall not commence construction or other work in
connection with such Modifications . . . without first entering into a Modification
Agreement with UTA and obtaining UTA's written consent." Id_. at 052 ^f 4.1 (emphasis
added). If such modifications were made they "shall become the property of UTA." Id.,
at 053 U 4.1.'
UTA has the right to realign the Freight Trackage as well as the Passenger
Trackage so long as it does not unreasonably interfere with freight rail service. IdL at
053-054, % 4.3. The parties agreed that SLCSR's use of even the Freight Trackage would

be limited to "12:00 midnight and 5:00 a.m., Monday through Friday." IcL at 056 ^ 5.4
SLCSR is to pay "taxes, assessments, fees, charges, costs and expenses related
solely to Freight Rail Service .. .."5 UTA is to pay all taxes, assessments, fees, charges,
costs and expenses related to the ownership of the Right of Way. Id. at 057, Tf 5.8
(emphasis added).
Nothing in this Agreement transfers the owner's obligation under Utah Statutes to
maintain good and sufficient crossings for the comfort and safety of motorists,
pedestrians or bicyclists to SLCSR. At most, SLCSR is allowed by the owner of this
railroad (UTA) to do maintenance only on tracks UTA designates and only to the extent
that such is deemed necessary for freight rail service. Rough grade crossings that
inconvenience motorists or even damage their automobiles do not need to be smoothed
out for freight rail service. Similarly, dangers or hazards posed to bicyclists by the
conditions of the crossing panels do not need to be alleviated for freight rail service.
Indeed, even if modification of the crossing panels were deemed necessary for freight rail
service, those modifications could not be done without first obtaining the permission of
the owner of the tracks (UTA). Id. 050, «|[ 3.1.
At some point, the condition of a crossing could become so bad that its repair
might be necessary for freight rail service. If, for example, the ties supporting the rail
under the crossing panels deteriorated to the point that the spikes would not hold, the
rails could move and cause a derailment. Also, if the rubber panels were completely
missing and a vehicle could become high centered and stuck on the track, that condition
5

If its easement was separately assessed, it also had to pay those taxes.

could result in a train/car collision or require the freight train to stop. Either of these
situations arguably would need to be remedied for freight rail service purposes. But such
situations are not the facts of this case. The subject statutes and the ordinance were not
enacted to assume the continuity of freight rail service. They exist to require the owner
of the tracks to keep the crossing reasonably smooth for those who use the public
thoroughfare where it intersects the railroad. It is absurd to contend that maintaining a
crossing for freight rail service would include keeping it reasonably smooth for
motorists, let alone bicyclists, pedestrians, skateboarders and rollerbladers.
More importantly, the statutory duties do not shift to SLCSR even if repairing
gaps for bicyclists were necessary for freight rail service. The three statutes and the
ordinance in question impose their duties upon the owner of the tracks. UTA, as owner
of the tracks, could have contracted to have someone else maintain its tracks. Such a
contract, however, would not relieve UTA of its statutory duties. If the contractor was
negligent in its maintenance of any UTA crossings, UTA would be in violation of the
statute. Depending upon the contractual terms, UTA, might be able to claim over against
its contractor, but the contract would not relieve UTA of its statutory obligations.
Here, unless the Agreement transferred ownership or at least control of the tracks
to SLCSR, the subject ordinance and statutes do not apply to SLCSR. Merely being
granted the right by the track's owner to do some maintenance work under certain
circumstances does not make SLCSR the new owner or operator of the tracks.
UTA was capable of complying with its statutory obligations. In fact, UTA
ultimately replaced the rubber panels at the subject crossing with concrete panels.

SLCSR knew before the accident that UTA was in the process of replacing all of its
crossing surfaces with new concrete panels. R. 6765, Tr. 604-05. If these statutes and
the ordinance applied to SLCSR in addition to UTA, SLCSR would have been required
to second guess UTAfs decisions as to the sequence of the crossing upgrades. SLCSR
had no right, let alone a statutory obligation, to tell UTA to replace the 1700 South
crossing before replacing the 2100 South crossing or vice versa. Similarly, SLCSR
should not be required to second guess UTA as to whether the design and installation of
the new crossings complies with the obligations imposed by the statutes.
Plaintiffs suggest SLCSR was doing crossing maintenance work elsewhere.
Plaintiffs do not contend, and there is no evidence, that SLCSR ever did anything to any
of UTA's crossings to maintain a gap free surface for bicyclists. Although SLCSR may
have done more than it was contractually obligated to do, that does not mean SLCSR had
contractual, let alone statutory and ordinance based, duties to maintain crossing surfaces
for non-freight purposes, including bicycle traffic.
The statutes and the ordinance at issue should not be held to impose legal duties
onto SLCSR to maintain the crossing surfaces of UTA's railroad so that they are
reasonably safe for the public, including bicyclists.
II.

AS A MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY, SLCSR SHOULD NOT BE
HELD TO HAVE A LEGAL DUTY TO MAKE CROSSING
SURFACES SO SMOOTH THAT THERE WOULD BE NO GAP
LARGE ENOUGH TO ACCOMMODATE ANY BICYCLE TIRE.

SLCSR agrees with plaintiffs that the owner or operator of railroads should keep
public grade crossings reasonably safe (not absolutely safe). Small, ordinary gaps at

railroad crossings should be held by this Court to be reasonably safe as a matter of law.
Railroad crossings are inherently bumpy. There always will be the necessary gaps
along the rails, in which the flange of locomotive and rail car wheels roll to prevent
derailments. Small gaps also develop and exist between wooden planks, rubber panels
and even between UTAfs current concrete panels. E.g., R. 6762, Tr. 104-05. Mr.
Nutting, an employee of the manufacturer of the rubber panels, testified that it is not
uncommon to have gaps between panels that are 3/4" wide. R. 6093-94. Unlike
pedestrians who expect relatively smooth sidewalks, reasonable travelers expect railroad
crossings to be bumpy and to have gaps. Bicyclists particularly anticipate such ordinary
and usual conditions. R. 6763, Tr. 357-361. C£. Foreman v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry., 74
P.2d 350, 351 (Okl. 1937) ("The difficulty with plaintiffs case is t h a t . . . all of her
evidence . . . failed to show any unsafe condition . . . . The evidence of the plaintiff
viewed in its most favorable aspect merely shows that the crossing was rough and
uneven.").
SLCSR does not ask for a ruling that unexpected hazards at railroad crossings do
not need to be addressed. SLCSR asks only that the known and anticipated conditions of
railroad crossings do not have to be eliminated. The Court can see from the photographs
of the subject crossing (e.g., SLCSR's Addendum at Tab 4) that it is in every respect an
ordinary and typical crossing. It presented no hazard to any segment of the public greater
than any other crossing. The owner or operator of such a crossing should not be required
by law to make a reasonably safe crossing safer. To hold that anyone had a duty to
eliminate the alleged 3/4" wide gap at the subject crossing is to move from a standard of

reasonable due care toward a standard of absolute care. SLCSR asks that the Court not
impose such a heightened duty onto even railroad owners.
There are scores of cases where ordinary and usual features of a railroad crossing,
like the small gap alleged by plaintiffs, have been held as a matter of law to be
reasonably safe. For example, in Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Wright, 126 S.W.2d
609 (Ark. 1939), the plaintiff alleged that he lost control of his automobile due to
"prominent humps" on each side of the railroad track at a crossing. In reversing a jury
verdict for the driver, the court noted there had been frequent use of the crossing before
and after the accident without incident. The court then favorably quoted Gable v.
Kriege, 267 N.W. 86 (Iowa 1936), as follows:
[The railroad] is not bound to make the highway more safe than highways usually
and ordinarily are made and kept for travel. From our common observation we all
know that, in nearly every mile of the highways of the country, there are to be
found depressions or ridges, or other irregularities of surface which do not
interfere with the safe use of the highway, when traveled over in the usual and
ordinary method, but which are sufficient to jolt vehicles passing over them. The
severity of the jolt would depend, of course, largely upon the speed at which the
vehicle is moving at the time it passes over. There is no duty resting upon a
railway company to keep the surface of the road, at the crossing, so smooth and
free from all inequalities that no jar or jolt will be caused by vehicles passing over
the crossing.
Idat613. 6
Even the Utah cases cited by plaintiffs support SLCSR's point. In Shugren v. Salt
Lake City. 48 Utah 320, 159 P. 530 (1916), the feature of the sidewalk that caused the
plaintiff to fall was not an ordinary feature to be anticipated, but was a two to three inch
6

See also New York Central R.R. Co. v. Sholl. 146 N.E.2d 565, 569 (Ind. Ct. App.
1957); Buffington v. Gulf & S. I. R. Co.. 188 So. 563 (Miss. 1939). Cf. Brooks v. New
York State Thruwav Auth.. 423 N.Y.S.2d 543, 545 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).

rise between sidewalk sections. This Court stated that if the rise existed where it would
be expected, such as from the street up to the sidewalk, it would not be the type of
obstruction "for which the municipality may be held liable." 48 Utah at 328-29, 159 P. at
533. This Court distinguished other cases by stating: "Here an abrupt projection is
allowed to remain where no one would be apt to look for it or expect it

" Id_. The

other Utah sidewalk cases cited by plaintiffs are the same. They all involved features in a
sidewalk that are unusual and not anticipated during ordinary use. Unlike sidewalks, the
law recognizes that roadway surfaces at railroad crossings are inherently rough and
require extra caution by travelers. See Point III, below.
Before Mr. Goebelfs accident, no one familiar with railroad crossings had ever
heard of a bicycle accident involving any gap between any surface material. R. 2603-04;
6762, Tr. 109; 6763, Tr. 293, 310, 364; 6764, Tr. 608; 6765, Tr. 630; and 6767, Tr.
1167. Moreover, the subject crossing was commonly used by bicyclists before and after
Mr. Goebefs accident without incident or complaint. SLCSRfs opening brief at 13-21.
As stated in Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Wright, there can be no better proof on the
issue of whether crossings with such small gaps are in a reasonably safe condition for the
ordinary use of the traveling public than that they were frequently used without incident.
126S.W.2dat613.
Furthermore, the expense of closing every gap in every railroad crossing that
might fit a bicycle tire of any size would be staggering. Mr. Shoemaker, UPs former
Railroad Crossing Engineer testified that to repair a gap,
" . . . you probably would have to take that panel out, or panels, clean that facility

out and put them back in, which may necessitate resurfacing the track, it may
necessitate replacement of some ties and some other work. . ..
Q: It could be a pretty big job?
A: It could be. In that case it would require the cooperation of the city or the
agencies that would close those lanes down, get traffic control out there, perform
the maintenance."
R. 2564-65. Gaps cannot be permanently eliminated because of the compression of the
panels from the movement of the track structure and surface caused by train and vehicle
traffic. Id. Thus, to require the elimination of all gaps in all crossings, and to never
allow them to reoccur, if even possible, would be an extremely disproportionate response
to a single, unexpected bicycle accident, assuming the alleged gap actually existed and
actually caused Mr. Goebel's accident.7
On the other hand, bicyclists can and do easily avoid injury from gaps in railroad
crossing surfaces. As a matter of public policy, the burden of preventing accidents from
such features at crossings should therefore be placed on them, as at least one court has
held. Knoxville v. Cooper, 265 S.W.2d 893 (Tenn. App. 1953), involved a motorcyclist
who was injured when he lost control of his motorcycle after running into a 1 to 1 !4 inch
deep, manhole-size depression in a street. That condition was "normal... on concrete
streets." Id. at 895. In reversing a jury verdict for the motorcyclist, the court ruled:
It is clear that no injury to an automobile, truck or wagon operated with
even slight care could result from the unevenness of the pavement here shown.
7

The case of Walden v. Montana. 818 P.2d 1190 (Mont. 1991), cited by plaintiffs, is
distinguished by the fact that the bicyclist was riding on an interstate where flat, smooth
surfaces that allow high speeds are expected. Under Montana law, bicyclists may be able
to ride on interstate highways. Under Utah law, bicyclists cannot because of minimum
speed limits they cannot maintain. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-49(1).

Due to their peculiar nature motorcycles must be balanced in an upright position.
Must a municipality maintain its streets in such perfect condition that such
vehicles may operate with safety equal to vehicles having four wheels and free
from the danger of being thrown off balance? Or, is the duty on the operators of
such vehicles to take note of such imperfections shown here by the undisputed
proof to be customary on streets paved with concrete?
In our view, to hold municipalities liable for such accidents would prove an
intolerable burden. On the other hand to require operators of motorcycles to
watch out for such common and slight defects and keep their vehicles under such
control as to avoid danger from them would place the burden where it belongs .
Id. at 896 (emphasis added); see also Hindman v. State Dept. of Highways and Public
Transp., 906 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Tex. App. 1994) ("[MJinor flaws in road shoulders are . . .
conditions that cyclists can and should anticipate when riding on a shoulder."). Not only
is such a simple precaution a matter of common sense, it is mandated by applicable law,
as discussed further in Point III, below.
Plaintiffs' only response to these public policy factors is that bicyclists should be
allowed to go as fast as they want over crossings, even so fast that they cannot see and
avoid anticipated roadway features. Plaintiffs reason the bicyclist should bear no fault
because he or she should not be prevented from being able to recover from others who
did not act to protect the bicyclist from his or her own conduct. Through such reasoning,
plaintiffs contend that others besides bicyclists should have the duty to inspect roadway
conditions ahead of where bicyclists may choose to ride at speeds chosen only by
bicyclists.
III.

REASONABLE FORESEEABILITY OF AN ACCIDENT MUST BE
BASED ON EVIDENCE PERTAINING TO WHAT SLCSR KNEW
OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN.

Plaintiffs do not dispute that no legal duty exists if an accident from the alleged

gap between panels one and eight (the "1-8 Gap") was not reasonably foreseeable to
SLCSR. In addition, plaintiffs do not dispute that no evidence was presented to prove
that SLCSR reasonably foresaw or should have foreseen harm to the public from that
particular gap. Plaintiffs' response to this point all but outright concedes no legal duty
existed.
Plaintiffs first cite where plaintiffs' expert, David Ingebretsen, stated that he only
had heard of bicyclists riding "into a grating, in a gutter or in the street where they have
those covers above the sewers and they have spaces in between them." R. 6766, Tr. 875.
Mr. Ingebretsen never heard of a bicyclist riding into a gap at a railroad crossing. IdL, Tr.
874. Plaintiff then speculates that bicyclists may have ridden into gaps at railroad
crossings without reporting the incident to anyone. Neither Mr. Ingebretsen's testimony
nor plaintiffs' speculation shows that SLCSR should have foreseen a bicyclist could or
would ride into the 1-8 Gap and be injured.
Plaintiffs next cite to the testimony of Mr. Nutting. He was employed by the
manufacturer of the rubber panels. He only testified that he thought before this accident
that gaps in any crossing material that were "three quarters of an inch or greater than that
in size, would present a hazard to a bicycle rider . . . I think that a substantial gap,
whatever you used would be a hazard for bicyclists." R. 6104-05. Thirteen
measurements were made of the 1-8 Gap. Mr. Stephens measured the gap at the east end
to be .812 inches. Mr. Ertel measured the gap at the east and west end to be 3/4 of an
inch. All of the measurements in the middle of the gap and Mr. Stephens' measurement
of the west end were less than 3/4 of an inch. See R. 6767 at Tr. 1181-83 and Ex. D-l

and P-62. Moreover, Mr. Nutting did not warn SLCSR or anyone else of any potential
hazard posed by gaps in his company's crossings. To the contrary, Mr. Nutting testified
that there are tens of thousands of crossings and his company's products had been sold in
countries where bicycles are the dominant mode of transportation, including Thailand,
Singapore, Japan, Taiwan, and in Europe. Yet even he had never heard of a case where a
bicyclist claimed to be injured from a gap between the rubber panels. R. 6106-07, 6119.
It cannot reasonably be inferred from Mr. Nutting's testimony that SLCSR should have
known the 1-8 Gap (whatever size it actually was before the accident) presented any
hazard to the public.
Plaintiffs also cite to the testimony of Mr. Jackson, who was an employee of
SLCSR. Mr. Jackson testified that he heard in July 1998, months after the accident, "that
an accident had happened in which somebody had gotten his bike caught in a gap." R.
6765, Tr. 622-23 (emphasis added). He then went to the crossing and looked for such a
gap. Id., Tr. 623. He clearly testified that before the subject accident, he never heard of
any bicyclist anywhere in the world having an accident because of a gap between rubber
panels. The thought never crossed his mind. Id.. Tr. 630-31. Mr. Jackson's testimony
proves the opposite of what plaintiffs' suggest. No reasonable juror could conclude from
his testimony that SLCSR knew or should have known that a 3/4" gap in a crossing
surface would cause harm to reasonable bicycle travelers.
Reasonable foreseeability cannot be supported by speculation. It cannot be
determined on the basis of hindsight. It must be proven upon a preponderance of the
evidence. Without evidence, there is no jury question. Hunsaker v. State, 870 P.2d 893,

897 (Utah 1993). This Court has consistently held that no duty exists, as a matter of law,
when there is no evidence to prove reasonable foreseeability.8 This Court explained:
As this court has often stated in other cases, it is regrettable that plaintiff suffered
injuries. However, "[n]ot every accident that occurs gives rise to a cause of action
upon which the party injured may recover damages from someone. Thousands of
accidents occur every day for which no one is liable in damages, and often no one
is to blame, not even the ones who are injured."
Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d at 479-80 (quoting Martin v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1142 (Utah 1977)). The instant action is such a case that
warranted entry of summary judgment and a directed verdict.9 In this case, no evidence
whatsoever exists upon which a reasonable jury could find for plaintiffs on this element
of their causes of action.
Moreover, in evaluating whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the alleged
gap would create a significant likelihood of harm, SLCSR had the right to assume
travelers were acting reasonably for their own safety. In this regard, if Mr. Goebel had
acted in accordance with his duties under the law, there is no reason to conclude that he

8

See, e.g., AMS Salt Industries, Inc. v. Magnesium Corp. of America, 942 P.2d 315
(Utah 1997); Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476 (Utah 1996); Hunsaker v.
State, 870 P.2d 893 (Utah 1993); Dwiggins v. Morgan Jewelers, 811 P.2d 182 (Utah
1991); Bansasine v. BodelL 927 P.2d 675 (Utah App. 1996).
9

Plaintiffs cite only Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985). In that case, the
Court held that an affidavit of an architect submitted by the plaintiff was sufficient
evidence to raise an issue of fact as to whether a particular window was negligently
designed and constructed. In that context, this Court stated that the fact that no prior
accident had occurred does not negate such positive evidence of improper design and
construction. The point is that the plaintiff in Williams had evidence to prove her case.
In the case at bar, plaintiffs presented no evidence that SLCSR knew or should have
known that UTA's crossing presented an unreasonable risk to others, and evidence that
no one else ever perceived such a risk filled that void as the only evidence on this issue.

probably would have ridden his bicycle into any gap he both could have seen and
avoided. Contrary to plaintiffs' suggestion, SLCSR is not arguing that there is no
reasonable foreseeability because Mr. Goebel was at fault in causing his own accident.
SLCSR is arguing that it is entitled to assume bicyclists will obey the law, and if the law
is obeyed, a reasonable bicyclist can see and avoid anticipated, common roadway
features at railroad crossings.
Bicyclists are required by law to keep a proper lookout and ride slow enough to
see and avoid observable surface hazards. Utah's traffic rules and regulations for motor
vehicles apply equally to bicyclists. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-84(1). Such rules and
regulations state, inter alia:
"A person may not operate a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable and
prudent under the existing conditions, giving regard to the actual and potential
hazards then existing, including when . . . approaching and crossing [a]. . .
railroad grade crossing. . .," UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-46(l)(a) (emphasis added).
Likewise, Salt Lake City Ordinance § 12.36.010 provides:
"Every person . . . riding a bicycle on a street... shall operate the same at a speed
and in a manner which is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having
regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing. ..." R. 2620 (emphasis
added).
Before even the owner of the tracks could be held to have had a duty to try to
reduce the width of the alleged gap that supposedly caused Mr. Goebel's accident,
plaintiffs had to prove that a reasonable bicyclist should have been anticipated by SLCSR
to ride at a speed and in a manner which would not enable him or her to observe and
avoid common bumps and gaps at railroad crossings. The gap plaintiffs allege caused
Mr. Goebel's accident was not hidden. If it existed, it was just as observable to Mr.

Goebel as plaintiffs claim it was to SLCSR, and Mr. Goebel was under a duty to ride in a
manner to be able to see and avoid it. Cf. Ellertson v. Dansie. 576 P.2d 867, 868 (Utah
1978); Soltv. Godfrey. 479 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah 1971); Steele v. Denver & Rio Grande
Western R.R. Co.. 396 P.2d 751,753 (Utah 1964).
IV.

PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO SHOW WHAT EVIDENCE PROVES THE
ALLEGED GAP IN FACT EXISTED BEFORE THE ACCIDENT
TO A WIDTH, DEPTH AND LENGTH THAT MR. GOEBEL'S
BICYCLE TIRE COULD FALL INTO IT.

Plaintiffs accuse SLCSR of asking the Court to speculate that the subject 1-8 Gap
became dangerous after the accident. That is not true. SLCSR pointed out to the Court
the evidence of what was seen and measured after the accident. No one measured or
even noticed a gap before the accident. After the accident, the measurements revealed
the gap was too small to accommodate Mr. Goebelfs bicycle tire. In reality, it is plaintiffs
who are asking the Court to speculate that a gap existed and was large enough that Mr.
Goebefs bicycle wheel could fall into it far enough that the wheel would strike the rail
with enough force to cause the known physical damage to the rim. Plaintiffs have not
shown the Court what evidence exists as to gap size because it is against their interest.
Plaintiffs cite Mr. Stephens1 testimony that, although he knows the measurements
he took in July revealed a width too narrow to accommodate the rim of the wheel, he did
not know what the width was in February. No one knows what the width of the 1-8 Gap
was when the accident occurred. No one measured it at or before that time. No one even
saw a gap until after the accident. Hence, plaintiffs are forced to suggest that contraction
and expansion occurs due to temperature changes, and the gap measured by Mr. Stephens

in July would have been wider in February. There is no evidence that these panels
actually did expand and contract with temperature changes, let alone that they could
contract enough to allow the 1-8 Gap to accommodate a bicycle tire in February that it
could not accommodate in July. Likewise, there is no evidence as to what kind of
temperature would cause a gap to widen. Is it air temperature, ground temperature or the
temperature of the surface of the pad? For all we know, the sun beating down on the pad
in February may produce a wider gap than would exist on a cloudy day in July.
Plaintiffs suggest that what Mr. Ertel measured on March 22, 1998 supports the
inference that the 1-8 Gap existed in February and was wide enough to accommodate the
tire when the accident occurred. Mr. Ertel measured the width only at the east and west
ends, and the gap at both ends was 3/4". R. 6763, Tr. 199. He used a regular tape
measure. Id., Tr. 197. Mr. Stephens used a more precise instrument, and in July
measured the gaps at the same ends to be .812" and .698." R. 6767, Tr. 1181-83; Ex. D1; Ex. P-62. Thus the gap at one end actually was measured to be wider in July than
what Mr. Ertel measured it to be in March. This undisputable fact contradicts plaintiffs1
speculation that the gap would have been widtr in March, when it was cold and the
panels allegedly had contracted.10
10

The tire was .967" wide, and the rim was .724" wide. One of Mr. Ertel's measurements
was .062 inches less than Mr. Stephens corresponding measurement (.750" vs. .812") and
the other one was .052 inches more than Mr. Stephens' measurement (.750" vs. .698").
One can add the greater difference (.062") to all of Mr. Stephens' measurements and still
not fit the tire into this gap. Even if one were to double that difference and add .124" to
Mr. Stephens' measurements, the 1-8 Gap would still only measure from east to west
1.06", .849", .724", .622", .687", .711", .716", .728", .769", .794" and .822". Thus, at
least eight inches in the middle of the gap, or over one-third of the gap, still would have
been too narrow for the bicycle rim to fall into the gap while Mr. Goebel was traveling

Outlandish and unsupportable speculation cannot replace the actual post-accident
measurements of the width of the gap along its entire length. These measurements
preclude plaintiffs1 theory that the bicycle wheel fell into the 21" long gap. Regardless of
the depth of the 1-8 Gap, of which there also only is speculation, it is impossible to
conclude that the 1-8 Gap existed in a size sufficient to have allowed Mr. Goebel's wheel
to fall the entire length and be channeled into the rail with enough force to damage the
rim. Mr. Ertel's March 22 measurements of only the width at the ends do not support the
proposition that the 1-8 Gap was physically capable of causing the accident as plaintiffs
and their expert speculate.
V.

PLAINTIFFS FAIL TO SHOW WHAT EVIDENCE PROVES THE
ALLEGED GAP IN FACT CAUSED MR. GOEBELS ACCIDENT.

In addition to having no evidence that the 1-8 Gap existed and was large enough
to be capable of causing the accident and rim damage, plaintiffs have not shown that
there is any evidence that it in fact caused the accident. Plaintiffs must do more than
suggest a possibility that Mr. Goebel rode his bicycle into the alleged 1-8 Gap, assuming
it was large enough to accommodate his bicycle wheel. Realizing this, plaintiffs state
that they have "direct evidence on that point." Plaintiffs' opposition brief at 37. Such
"direct evidence" does not exist.

approximately 25 to 30 feet per second, across the 21" long 1-8 Gap. Plaintiffs' accident
reconstruction expert, Mr. Ingebertsen, testified that if the wheel could fall the entire
length of the gap (in other words, if it was wide and deep enough along the entire
length), it would fall at most lA" to one inch. R. 6766, Tr. 867-70. That is hardly a
significant bump for a bicycle, but even if it were, the point is that the tire would have to
be falling the entire length of the seam (21"), to fall that far given the speed of the
bicycle.

Plaintiffs' "direct evidence" merely is their attempt to show the Court that Mr.
Woolley's, SLCSR?s expert's, conclusions of what would be required to satisfy the
physical evidence makes no sense in light of Mr. Ingebretsen's speculative theory of what
happened. Plaintiffs do not dispute that Mr. Goebel has no recollection of riding into any
gap. R. 6765, Tr. 659, 673-74, 716. No witness saw Mr. Goebel ride into any gap. No
person who attended to Mr. Goebel at the scene testified that it appeared Mr. Goebel
rode into a gap. The particular theory that the 1-8 Gap caused the accident was not
formed until years after the accident by plaintiffs1 testifying expert, Mr. Ingebretsen. His
speculation is the sole evidence for that theory.
Mr. Ingebretsen did not witness the accident. He does not know what happened.
He opines that Mr. Goebel's bicycle wheel fell into the 1-8 Gap, but he does not account
for the physical evidence that the gap was too narrow along its entire length and therefore
too short given Mr. Goebel's speed. Mr. Woolley has suggested other possibilities that
are consistent with the physical evidence, specifically the amount of damage to Mr.
Goebel's bicycle rim. R. 6766, Tr. 983-1046; Tr. 6767, Tr. 1056-1099. Plaintiffs also
called the EMT who attended to Mr. Goebel, Jeffrey Allan Clark, and his reaction of
what happened was that the crossing surface was slippery. R. 6763, Tr. 239-40. He did
not even notice any gaps in the crossing surface. IdL_, Tr. 227, 236-37. The possibilities
of what happened are limited only by imagination. It is obvious that Mr. Ingebretsen
served solely as the mouthpiece for plaintiffs' particular speculative theory as it evolved
after the accident. His testimony is nothing but speculation. It is not direct evidence of
what happened.

Speculative theories in similar cases, even when espoused by witnesses, have been
deemed insufficiently supported by evidence to warrant a trial or to uphold a verdict for
the plaintiff. For example, in Foster v. New York Central System. 402 F.2d 312 (7th Cir.
1968), a motorcyclist sued a railroad for failing to repair a crossing where the grade
allowed the track to protrude above the roadway surface. The cyclist claimed the
protruding track caused him to lose control and fall. In affirming summary judgment for
the railroad, the court noted,
[P]laintiff... can remember nothing about the accident[, and] there were no eye
witnesses to the occurrence. The only facts relied upon by the plaintiff were as
follows: Defendant owns a railroad track which crosses [a sjtreet...; this track is,
contrary to Indiana law, improperly graded and is protruding above the grade.
Plaintiff was found some sixty feet to the south of the track and the motorcycle
was found somewhat closer to the track....
Id. at 313. The court held that, as a matter of law, such evidence was insufficient to
prove causation, and it refused to consider speculative inferences, stating:
[Ujnexplained circumstances do not permit the drawing of inferences . . . . It is
well settled that a decision or finding must be based upon the proven facts and
cannot be based upon mere guess, conjecture, surmise, possibility or speculation.
. . . The only facts which plaintiff could have proven were capable of more than
one interpretation, but no interpretation could have been based on anything other
than unsupported inferences. Without the possibility of witnesses or testimony
from plaintiff no jury would have been justified in inferring that the accident
happened in a particular manner.
Id. at 313-14 (quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added).11
In this case, plaintiffs lack evidence similarly with the claimants in Foster or the
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See also Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. Wright. 126 S.W.2d 609, 614 (Ark. 1939);
Castellaw v. Pollard. 183 S.E. 927, 927 (Ga. Ct. App. 1936); Mississippi Export R.R.
Co. v. Miller. 193 So. 2d 134, 136 (Miss. 1966); Foreman v. Chicago. R. I & P. Rv. Co..
74P.2d350,352(Ok. 1937).

cases cited in footnote 11. The only evidence plaintiffs have is that Mr. Goebel had an
accident somewhere in the vicinity of the subject crossing, his body and bicycle were
found some distance west of the crossing, the bicycle was damaged, and two or three
days later, a gap between the crossing panels (which is no longer asserted to be the gap
that caused this accident) was observed. Such is insufficient, as a matter of law, to prove
causation from the different 1-8 Gap alleged at trial to be the offending gap.
CONCLUSION
SLCSR respectfully requests that the directed verdict in its favor be affirmed, and
that this Court hold that SLCSR owed no statutory duty to the public to maintain the
crossing surfaces of UTAfs railroad.
DATED this 18th day of December, 2003.
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